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INTRODUCTION 
A professional offered a software engineering job at a big Silicon 
Valley company seems to be in a good position to negotiate her 
employment contract.  She is educated, has experience, and may even 
negotiate her salary and fringe benefits, but she is unlikely to demand 
her prospective employer remove the mandatory arbitration provision 
in her employment agreement.  Why?  Because she needs the job.  
Now imagine this professional is a Senegalese national who has 
waited months to be sponsored on an H-1B visa by the same Silicon 
Valley company.  All of her immigration paperwork has gone through 
and she has arranged to come to the United States.  However, when 
she receives her employment contract, it contains a mandatory 
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arbitration provision.  She thinks she understands what the provision 
means, but she does not argue against it because she is afraid that if 
she does, she may lose her job, causing her H-1B visa to be 
terminated.   
Fast forward a year later: that same Senegalese software engineer 
is having problems with her employer.  The company is 
discriminating against her and many other female software engineers.  
She consults an attorney who tells her the case would be best pursued 
as a class action, otherwise the claim is too small to be worthwhile.  
The problem is that the mandatory arbitration provision she “agreed” 
to bars her from bringing any action before a court.  Because her 
individual claim is not worth the trouble, she never asserts her rights 
and continues to bear the worsening discrimination at work. 
The fairness and ethics of mandatory arbitration have been 
sharply debated.1  A recent Supreme Court decision upholding the 
enforceability of mandatory arbitration in employment contracts 
appears to have settled this debate.2  However, workers still face 
challenges in asserting their rights when their employers impose 
arbitration.3  Some scholars suggest mandatory arbitration is less 
likely to harm employees with high levels of education, income, and 
experience.4  Despite their education, income, and experience, skilled 
 
1. Laetitia L. Cheltenham, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and 
Class Action Waivers After AT&T v. Concepcion, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 273, 277 
(2012); see also United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) 
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006); EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127 (2006). 
2. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018). 
3. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 
94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 10 (2019). 
4. See Allison E. McClure, The Professional Presumption: Do Professional 
Employees Really Have Equal Bargaining Power When They Enter into 
Employment-Related Adhesion Contracts?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1515 (2006) 
(providing rationales for findings of equal bargaining power between professional 
employees and employers); cf. E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees 
and Small Employers from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment 
Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 628 (2009) (arguing that 
“high-level” employees do not face the same problems with mandatory arbitration as 
other “low-level” employees because of bargaining power, sophistication, and 
“informational advantages in negotiating”). 
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immigrants5 in the technology sector (“tech”) are actually in a worse 
position than their native-born counterparts to negotiate employment 
terms.6  This is because visa sponsorship requires a single employer to 
sponsor a skilled immigrant to work in the United States, meaning the 
immigrant employee cannot easily transfer their visa to a different 
employer.7  Changing employers or being fired puts a skilled 
immigrant worker at significant risk for deportation.8  Being restricted 
to a single employer creates a compelling incentive for skilled 
immigrant workers to accept unfavorable arbitration terms.9  In 
response to this problem and the fact that mandatory arbitration is a 
polarizing issue, this article presents a balanced solution that weighs 
the protection of skilled immigrant rights against the benefits of 
arbitration. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of skilled 
immigrant workers in the United States, explains arbitration 
procedure, and introduces the arguments for and against mandatory 
arbitration.  Part II analyzes the current judicial and legislative 
positions on arbitration, describes skilled immigrants in the tech 
industry, and explores ways tech workers have pushed back against 
mandatory arbitration.  Part III proposes a hybrid solution to the issue 
of mandatory arbitration.  Finally, this Comment offers a brief 
conclusion on the unique challenges skilled immigrants face regarding 
mandatory arbitration. 
 
5. While recognizing the multitude of problems that mandatory arbitration 
creates for low-wage earning immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, this 
paper does not address these groups and is narrowly focused on skilled immigrants 
in the tech industry.   
6. Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth 
Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 928 
(2007) [hereinafter Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor]. 
7. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D) (2019) (requiring a skilled immigrant on an H-
1B visa wishing to change employers to have the prospective employer submit a 
completely new visa application that must be approved before the change of 
employment can take place); see also Symposium, Working Borders: Linking 
Debates About Insourcing and Outsourcing of Capital and Labor, 40 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 691, 802 (2005) [hereinafter Working Borders] (advocating for additional legal 
rights for immigrants, like the ability to port work visas to another employer). 
8. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor, supra note 6, at 926. 
9. See Working Borders, supra note 7, at 802 (explaining how the prospect of 
portable employment visas would give skilled immigrants more bargaining power). 
3
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I. POSITIONS ON MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
Mandatory arbitration agreements are common in employment 
contracts.10  Professor Michael Z. Green11 describes the increase in 
these agreements and states, “[A]greements to arbitrate have expanded 
to virtually every possible contractual setting, including the 
employment relationship.”12  In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued 
a 5-4 decision in Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,13 which essentially leaves 
employees at the mercy of employer-dictated arbitration clauses.14  
The dissent in Epic Systems outlined several problems with mandatory 
arbitration of employment disputes, but primarily focused  on the 
ways mandatory arbitration eviscerates employee rights to collective 
actions.15  Because skilled immigrants are restricted to a single, 
sponsoring employer when they work in the United States on an 
employment visa, they are particularly vulnerable to unfair 
employment conditions,16 including injustices caused by mandatory 
 
10. Peter Danysh, Employing the Right Test: The Importance of Restricting 
AT&T v. Concepcion to Consumer Adhesion Contracts, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1433, 
1439 (2013). 
11. Professor Michael Z. Green is a law professor at Texas A&M University 
Law School. He has been a full tenure professor since 2005. Before his academic 
career he worked as manager for a Fortune 500 company before law school and later 
represented employers as a chief negotiator. 
12. Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining 
Power in Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 
10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 77, 80 (2003). 
13. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
14. See Ronald Turner, The FAA, The NLRA, and Epic Systems’ Epic Fail, 98 
TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 18 (2019). 
15. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1633-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion); 
see also Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards 
Justice in Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 
179 (2019) [hereinafter Sternlight, Stymies Progress] (explaining how mandatory 
arbitration prevents employees from bringing class action lawsuits). 
16. See Matthew Lister, Justice and Temporary Labor Migration, 29 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 116 (2014) (explaining how skilled immigrants are vulnerable 
because they are unable to easily change employers on the same visa, which makes 
immigrant workers “more susceptible to abuse”); see also Miles B. Farmer, 
Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J. 
2346, 2355 (2012) (“Mandatory arbitration presents large potential for abuse, 
particularly in cases where the parties have unequal bargaining power.”). 
4
California Western Law Review, Vol. 57 [2021], No. 1, Art. 14
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol57/iss1/14
White camera ready final (Do Not Delete) 1/26/2021  11:04 AM 
2020] THE UNLIKELY UNDERDOG 183 
arbitration.  Working in the United States on an employment visa 
leaves skilled immigrants with very few options or bargaining power 
to negotiate employment terms.17 
A.  Immigrant Workers and the Challenges of H-1B Sponsorship 
Immigrant workers are essential to the United States.18  According 
to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 28.4 million “foreign 
born” individuals were part of the U.S. work force in 2019.19  In 2007 
twenty-five percent of immigrants in the United States were present 
through employment-based immigration visas.20  The H-1B visa an  
employment visa that allows highly-skilled immigrants to work in the 
United States.21  H-1B visas require a single employer to sponsor an 
immigrant worker.22  Highly-skilled immigrants employed in the tech 
industry are often present in the United States on these visas.23 
 
17. See Janna Giesbrecht-McKee, The Fairness Problem: Mandatory 
Arbitration in Employment Contracts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259, 268-69 (2014) 
(explaining that employees are compelled to agree when they have limited 
employment options and their employment is conditioned on consent to mandatory 
arbitration provisions). 
18. See Yasser Killawi, Preserving an Entrepreneurial America: How 
Restrictive Immigration Policies Stifle the Creation and Growth of Startups and 
Small Businesses, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 129, 142 (2013). 
19. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor 
Force Characteristics–2019 (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf. (describing foreign-born workers 
as legally-admitted immigrants, refugees, temporary residents such as students and 
temporary workers, and undocumented immigrants). 
20. Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rethinking Immigration of the 
Highly-Skilled and Educated in the Post-9/11 World, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 
496 (2007); see also Julie Monroe, Protecting the H-1B Visa: A Promise to “Hire 
American” in the “Nation of Immigrants”, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (2019) 
(“The H-1B visa is the classic route for ‘highly educated, foreign-born students 
hoping to work in the U.S.”). 
21. Killawi, supra note 18, at 144 (explaining that the H-1B visa is “the 
primary source for highly skilled immigrants in the U.S. workforce”). 
22. Lister, supra note 16, at 116. 
23. See Jung S. Hahm, American Competitiveness and Workforce 
Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New 
H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1673, 1682 (2000) (explaining that the 
U.S. high-tech industry largely participates in the H-1B visa program to meet the 
demand for skilled workers); see also Dina Gerdeman, Immigrant High-Tech 
5
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The H-1B visa is especially important to Silicon Valley 
companies because the visas are used to satisfy the tech industry’s 
demand for highly-skilled workers through hiring of skilled 
immigrants.24  The number of available H-1B visas is limited to 
65,000 visas each fiscal year and an additional 20,000 visas are 
allocated to workers who hold advanced degrees from U.S. 
universities.25  Yet, demand for H-1B visas consistently exceeds the 
annual limit with more than 200,000 petitions submitted annually.26  
From 2010-2016, Silicon Valley had the second highest number of 
approved H-1B visas nationally.27  The high demand for H-1B visas 
compared to their limited availability makes securing an H-1B visa 
extremely competitive, especially in the technology industry.28 
Applying for an H-1B visa is a challenging and expensive 
process.29  Since the allocation of total H-1B visas is reached quickly, 
applicants have a short window in which they must submit their visa 
application.30  H-1B applications are subject to a lottery system where 
applications are randomly selected for adjudication.31  Although an 
employer has no way of knowing whether their application will be 
 
Workers Not Costing US Jobs, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/01/22/immigrant-high-
tech-workers-not-costing-us-jobs/#1e7adaa74f72. 
24. See Danielle M. Drago, Losing the Best and the Brightest: The 
Disappearing Wage Premium for H-1B Visa Recipients, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 1051, 1054 (2015) (explaining that the demand for skilled immigrants in the 
technology industry “remains largely unmet,” and in order to satisfy this demand, 
employers turn to the H-1B visa to hire foreign workers). 
25. Robert D. Aronson & Debra A. Schneider, A Bridge over Troubled 
Waters: The High-Skilled Worker Rule and Its Impact on Employment-Based 
Immigration, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 935, 939 (2018). 
26. Id. 
27. Neil G. Ruiz & Jens Manuel Krogstad, East Coast and Texas metros had 
the most H-1B visas for skilled workers from 2010 to 2016, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/29/h-1b-visa-
approvals-by-us-metro-area/. 
28. Drago, supra note 24, at 1054. 
29. Monroe, supra note 20, at 1388. 
30. See id. (in 2016 the H-1B cap was reached in five days). 
31. Emily C. Callan, Is the Game Still Worth the Candle (or the Visa)? How 
the H-1B Visa Lottery Lawsuit Illustrates the Need for Immigration Reform, 80 ALB. 
L. REV. 335, 336 (2017). 
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selected for processing, employers often try to increase their chances 
of selection.32  Applications not selected are eligible for resubmission 
the following year.33   
The structure of the H-1B visa application process keeps 
employees restricted to their employers; only a single employer can 
sponsor an immigrant worker.34  To change employers, the skilled 
immigrant employee must have their new H-1B employer submit a 
new visa petition on the employee’s behalf.35  If the petition is denied, 
the immigrant employee’s authorization to work in the United States 
will be terminated.36   
Skilled immigrants must wait years for their immigration status to 
change from an H-1B immigrant to permanent resident due to 
immigration backlogs.37  While waiting to become a permanent 
resident, immigrant employees must remain employed with the same 
employer.38  Termination of employment will terminate the immigrant 
employee’s H-1B status,39 which can eliminate the immigrant 
worker’s only chance of becoming a permanent resident.  Terminated 
status can also lead to deportation.40  The risk of deportation also 
applies to a spouse or child covered under a skilled immigrant’s H-1B 
visa.41  Because of this close, interdependent relationship, the 
 
32. See id. at 345 (describing how some large employers use subsidiaries to 
submit multiple H-1B applications for the same employees). 
33. Id. at 336. 
34. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (2019).  
35. 8 U.S.C § 1184 (2020). 
36. 8 U.S.C § 1184(n)(1) (2020). 
37. Janice D. Villiers, Closing the Borders: Reverse Brain Drain and the Need 
for Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1877, 1889 (2009). 
38. Julia Funke, Supply and Demand: Immigration of the Highly Skilled and 
Educated in the Post-9/11 Market, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 419, 443 (2015). 
39. Christopher Fulmer, Comment, A Critical Look at the H-1B Visa Program 
and Its Effects on U.S. and Foreign Workers-A Controversial Program Unhinged 
from Its Original Intent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 855 (2009). 
40. See Maria L. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A 
Continuum of Exploitation for High Tech Workers, 38 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 
1, 3 (2017) [hereinafter Ontiveros, H-1B Visas]. 
41. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor, supra note 6, at 926. 
7
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immigrant worker’s reliance on the sponsoring H-1B employer has 
been described as a “de facto indentured servitude.”42 
Many tech companies are founded or led by skilled immigrants.43  
Immigrant entrepreneurship is important to the U.S. economy and 
drives economic growth.44 California has the most immigrant-
founded, startup companies valued at least $1 billion or more 
headquartered in the state.45  Such companies include SpaceX and 
Uber.46  Silicon Valley, California is home to at least 2,000 tech 
companies.47  Like other companies, tech companies often include 
mandatory arbitration clauses in their employment agreements.48  
However, the trend of using mandatory arbitration clauses in the 
context of employment agreements appears to be changing in Silicon 
Valley.49   
 
42. Fulmer, supra note 39, at 855; see also Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note 
40, at 4 (discussing how the H-1B visas program perpetuates a form of involuntary 
servitude). 
43. See Villiers, supra note 37, at 1877-78. 
44. Killawi, supra note 18, at 131. 
45. Stuart Anderson, NFAP Policy Brief: Immigrants and Billion Dollar 
Startups, NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POL’Y (March 2016) http://nfap.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Immigrants-and-Billion-Dollar-Startups.NFAP-Policy-
Brief.March-2016.pdf. 
46. Id. at 1-2. 
47. Kimberly Amadeo, Silicon Valley, America’s Innovative Advantage, THE 
BALANCE (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-silicon-valley-
3305808. 
48. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in 
Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of 
Employment, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1235 (2002) (stating that arbitration 
agreements are standard in most employment contracts). 
49. See Andrew Bratslavsky, Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Assaults in 
Maritime Law, 31 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 198, 219 (2019) (explaining that influential 
Silicon Valley companies are creating a new trend around mandatory arbitration, 
specifically with sexual harassment cases). 
8
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B.  An Overview of Arbitration 
Arbitration is a type of alternative dispute resolution50 where the 
parties select a neutral arbitrator to assist them in resolving their 
dispute.51  The arbitrator is not required to adhere to relevant law52 
unless the law to be applied is specified in the party’s arbitration 
agreement.53 Many arbitration agreements do not address this issue, in 
which case,54  the arbitrator will apply the rules of their arbitration 
organization,55 or “interpret[] the agreement between the parties.”56  
The arbitrator’s decision is binding and final, unless it can be shown 
that the arbitrator reached the decision by “manifestly disregard[ing] 
the law.”57  In cases where there is a significant problem with the 
arbitration process, the parties can seek to have a court determine the 
validity of an arbitration award.58  Agreements that impose arbitration 
clauses are typically considered a type of adhesion contract because 
the party with less bargaining power is usually unable to negotiate or 
reject the arbitration terms.59  Applied in the context of employment, 
an employee is unlikely to reject or negotiate an arbitration provision 
because the employer has superior bargaining power and can simply 
elect not to hire the employee.60  Skilled immigrants relying on an 
employment visa to work likely find themselves in this position. 
 
50. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal 
Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 469, 469 (2006). 
51. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and 
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 454 (1996). 
52. Donna Meredith Matthews, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory 
Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
347, 350 (1997). 
53. Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and 
the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 112 (1997). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 118. 
56. Matthews, supra note 52, at 351. 
57. See Burton, supra note 50, at 473. 
58. Id. at 473-74. 
59. See id. at 479; Matthews, supra note 52, at 373. 
60. Matthews, supra note 52, at 373. 
9
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The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is the guiding legislation on 
arbitration.  The relevant text of the FAA states, “[a]n agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”61  With the enactment of the FAA, 
Congress made parties’ election to arbitrate enforceable through 
contract law.62  Even after the FAA was enacted, courts initially cited 
public policy as a basis not to enforce arbitration clauses.63  
Eventually, however, courts moved towards a uniform policy of 
enforcing the FAA, which meant judicial enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses.64 
The practice of imposing arbitration was not always a widespread 
or favored mechanism for dispute resolution as it is now.65  Despite a 
broad approach to enforcement, courts were careful not to impede 
employees’ rights, and often rejected enforcement of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in certain employment disputes.66  Over time, 
courts abandoned their position against mandatory arbitration in 
employment agreements.67  With the judiciary’s backing, employers 
used the FAA as a basis to enforce arbitration clauses in employment 
agreements.68  In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, the 
 
61. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
62. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1996). 
63. Id. 
64. Turner, supra note 14, at 18. 
65. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) (explaining that mandatory arbitration is a more recent 
phenomenon) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping]. 
66. See Meredith Goldich, Throwing Out the Threshold: Analyzing the 
Severability Conundrum Under Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 60 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1673, 1687 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court case Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc., where the court rejected arbitration of a FLSA 
employment claim). 
67. See Martha Nimmer, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 12 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 183, 196 (2010) (stating lower courts cited the 
Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation “to 
enforce mandatory arbitration provisions in employment contracts”). 
68. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment 
Arbitration After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 457-58 (2016) (stating the 
10
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Supreme Court used the FAA to hold that a stock broker’s age 
discrimination claim was subject to mandatory arbitration.69  Not 
surprisingly, following Gilmer, in the late 1990’s, the use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements increased 
significantly.70  Similar holdings followed in several cases leading up 
to the Supreme Court decision in Epic Systems in 2018.71  With the 
judiciary’s shift towards enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements, employers gained a strong position to impose arbitration 
on employees.72 
C.  What’s So Wrong with Mandatory Arbitration? 
Requiring employees to sign agreements containing mandatory 
arbitration provisions—as a condition of employment—is often 
viewed as coercive and problematic for employees.73  An individual 
seeking a job does not have much bargaining power, if any at all, 
when it comes to negotiating how a future dispute with an employer 
should be resolved.74  This is especially true for skilled immigrants 
who are not only seeking employment, but who are also seeking an 
employer’s sponsorship: a lengthy and costly process.75  Most 
employees are presented employment agreements with mandatory 
arbitration clauses on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.76  In other 
instances, employees are simply deemed to have knowledge of 
 
FAA was not intended for employment agreements, but the Supreme Court extended 
FAA enforcement to employment agreements with its holding in Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)).   
69. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
70. See Nimmer, supra note 67, at 187. 
71. See generally, Turner, supra note 14. 
72. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 262. 
73. Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note 68, at 458; Stephanie Greene & 
Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court Endorses Mandatory 
Individual Arbitration Agreements-#timesup on Workers’ Rights, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 43, 45 (2019). 
74. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 45 (explaining agreements 
with mandatory arbitration provisions are offered to employees as a condition of 
employment). 
75. Sameer Ahmed, Targeting Highly-Skilled Immigrant Workers in A Post-
9/11 America, 79 UMKC L. REV. 935, 987 (2011). 
76. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 45. 
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mandatory arbitration clauses when such clauses are emailed to 
unsuspecting employees or hidden in fine print.77   
Mandatory arbitration is criticized for other reasons as well.  First, 
mandatory arbitration can restrict an employee’s access to courts.78  
Arbitration also prevents class action litigation, which can be useful 
when an employee’s individual claims are weak or monetarily 
insubstantial.79  Third, employers that routinely arbitrate tend to win 
more cases than employees.80  There is also a fairness and impartiality 
concern because employers often select and pay the arbitrator.81  
Further, arbitration ensures that claims of sexual harassment and 
discrimination are hidden from the public eye.82  Finally, arbitrators 
do not have to be attorneys or even judges.83   
 
77. Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 171-72; see also 
Colvin, supra note 3, at 10 (“Although mandatory employment arbitration is usually 
established by having employees sign an arbitration agreement, typically at the time 
of hiring, in some instances businesses adopt arbitration procedures simply by 
announcing that these procedures have been incorporated into the organization’s 
employment policies as part of the procedures for resolving workplace conflicts or 
grievances.”). 
78. Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees How American Employers Are 
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) [hereinafter Sternlight, Disarming Employees]. 
79. Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 65, at 1652. 
80. Cf. Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note 68, at 462-63 (explaining 
that employees win less often against employers that repeatedly arbitrate at high 
rates). 
81. See Sharon Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 
134 (1996) (explaining that arbitration decisions can be motivated by a desire on the 
part of the arbitrator to secure repeat business from employers and, accordingly, 
arbitrators may recognize the benefit of providing favorable decisions to employers 
over employees who are unlikely to use arbitration frequently). 
82. See Marissa Ditkowsky, Comment, #Ustoo: The Disparate Impact of and 
Ineffective Response to Sexual Harassment of Low-Wage Workers, 62 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 69, 76-77 (2019) (discussing how the #Metoo movement has 
highlighted the way mandatory arbitration prohibits sexual harassment and 
discrimination claims in court). 
83. Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing 
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 
1425 (2004) [hereinafter Sternlight, Best Procedure]. 
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D.  Benefits of Arbitration 
By contrast, supporters of arbitration argue that the procedure is 
actually beneficial for employees.  Although mandatory arbitration is 
overwhelmingly criticized, employees can benefit from arbitration as 
a form of dispute resolution.84  Litigation takes time, but arbitration is 
lauded as being quick and efficient, which can be attractive to 
employees.85 However, because arbitration requires up-front fees, and, 
in some cases, the same kinds of costs associated with trial, it is not 
completely settled whether arbitration is cost effective (though 
proponents of arbitration generally argue that it is).86  Nonetheless, 
arbitration can be less expensive than litigation depending on the 
particular case and how it is arbitrated.87  Although arbitration 
requires up-front fees, proponents argue it is more cost effective than 
litigation.88  For example, some cases may be arbitrated in a couple of 
hours or entirely by phone.89  Proponents also argue arbitration “is 
more likely to preserve a good relationship with an employer” and 
“allows employer savings to funnel into more generous employee 
compensation and benefits.”90  For skilled immigrants, preserving 
their employment relationship is paramount since their immigration 
 
84. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 266. 
85. Amanda R. James, Because Arbitration Can Be Beneficial, It Should Never 
Have to Be Mandatory: Making A Case Against Compelled Arbitration Based upon 
Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Consumer and Employee Adhesion 
Contracts, 62 LOY. L. REV. 531, 537 (2016). 
86. Id. at 538. (explaining that there is a question as to the cost efficiency of 
arbitration and a lack of empirical data to draw a clear conclusion). 
87. See Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note 68, at 466 (explaining how 
low-income workers can benefit from arbitration because some view arbitration as 
cheaper); see also Burton, supra note 50, at 472-73 (describing “arbitration will be 
tailored to the dispute” with arbitration duration and discovery level depending on 
the stakes of each arbitration); compare James, supra note 85, at 538-39 (suggesting 
that arbitration may or may not be less expensive for litigants depending on different 
factors), with Rhys E. Burgess, Comment, Protecting Those Who Cannot Protect 
Themselves: The Efficacy of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Homes, 
17 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 15 (2015) (“Arbitration advocates claim that by curtailing 
pre-trial procedures such as discovery, litigation costs are substantially reduced[.]”). 
88. James, supra note 85, at 538. 
89. Burton, supra note 50, at 472-73. 
90. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 266. 
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status likely depends on it.91  One of the issues underlying the benefits 
of arbitration is the assumption that employees voluntarily choose to 
arbitrate their disputes.92  However, when an employee does not 
voluntarily choose to arbitrate and, instead, is forced to arbitrate, the 
perceived advantages of arbitration are called into question.93  This is 
especially true when there are disparate bargaining advantages 
between tech companies and skilled immigrants who are relying on 
the employer for their H-1B visa sponsorship. 
Arbitration procedures are also typically more flexible and 
oftentimes the parties can decide the rules governing their 
arbitration.94  Although being an attorney is not a requirement to be an 
arbitrator,95 arbitrators can include experts in a given area.  Relying on 
experts in a given area may be preferable to parties and helpful in 
resolving their dispute.96 
II. NAVIGATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
A.  Epic Systems: The Supreme Court’s Recent Support for Mandatory 
Arbitration 
The Supreme Court’s latest decision on mandatory arbitration in 
the employment context has a profound impact on employees.97  The 
Epic Systems decision is comprised of three separate employment 
disputes.98  Each dispute was subject to contract provisions that 
imposed arbitration and waived the employees’ ability to bring or 
participate in class action litigation.99  In each suit, the plaintiff 
employee brought either a court action or a class action in direct 
 
91. See Ahmed, supra note 75, at 945-46 (explaining how immigrants present 
on H-1B visas often do not change employers for fear of delay or disruption of their 
immigrant status). 
92. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 275. 
93. Id. at 267. 
94. James, supra note 85, at 540; see Cole, supra note 51, at 456 (stating when 
parties select arbitration, they can elect their own procedures). 
95. Sternlight, Best Procedure, supra note 83, at 1425. 
96. Cole, supra note 51, at 457. 
97. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 44. 
98. Turner, supra note 14, at 31. 
99. Id. 
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opposition to the mandatory arbitration clauses each had signed.100  
Because the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) forbids waivers 
of collective actions in the employment context, the employees raised 
an illegality defense under the FAA’s savings clause.101  The Court 
conceded arbitration clauses could be revoked due to a contract 
defense, like illegality, but rejected the employees’ argument, 
reasoning that arbitration clauses were not illegal merely because the 
clause required the parties to arbitrate their disputes.102  In sum, the 
Court held the NLRA does not supersede the FAA, making class 
action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements enforceable.103 
One major issue with the Court’s decision is the presumption 
employees knowingly and consensually enter into arbitration 
agreements.104  Justice Gorsuch framed the main issue in Epic Systems 
as follows: “Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that 
any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one 
arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their 
claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with 
their employers?”105  By assuming employees knowingly enter into 
arbitration agreements, the Court overlooks extensive information 
underscoring the disparity in bargaining power between employers 
and employees.106  The Court also overlooks the coercive nature of 
mandatory arbitration agreements, especially when an arbitration 
agreement is tied to a job,107 or in the case of skilled immigrants, H-
1B visa sponsorship. 
Ultimately, the decision in Epic Systems denies employees the 
ability to challenge mandatory arbitration clauses in employment 
agreements, which in turn prevents employees from asserting their 
 
100. Id. at 32. 
101. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018). 
102. Id. at 1623; see also Turner, supra note 14, at 34-35 (discussing Justice 
Gorsuch’s rejection of the illegality defense to mandatory arbitration clauses in Epic 
Systems). 
103. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1624; Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra 
note 73, at 46. 
104. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 70. 
105. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619. 
106. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 70. 
107. Id. 
15
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rights through a class or collective action mechanism.108  The Epic 
Systems decision is generally viewed as “one of the most significant 
and most damaging to employees.”109  With the Epic Systems 
decision, employees are left with little recourse against mandatory 
arbitration clauses imposed by their employers.110   
Like most employees, skilled immigrants are vulnerable to the 
ramifications of Epic Systems, but they are even more vulnerable 
because, as professionals, they are viewed as having equal bargaining 
power with employers.111  This mistaken presumption likely causes 
legislators and judges to presume skilled immigrants have equal 
bargaining power with their employers and overlook the specific 
challenges skilled immigrants face regarding mandatory arbitration 
provisions in an employment contract.  One specific challenge for 
skilled immigrants is their visa sponsorship essentially binds them to 
their employer.112  This causes skilled immigrants to have even less 
bargaining power than an average employee because if they challenge 
the mandatory arbitration agreements in their employment contracts, 
skilled immigrants cannot easily seek an alternate employer. 
Justice Ginsburg led a powerful dissent in Epic Systems that began 
by placing the NLRA and its predecessor statute, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act (“NLGA”), within historical context.113  After 
illustrating longstanding power imbalances between employees and 
employers, Justice Ginsburg explained that Congress enacted the 
NLGA and NLRA with “acute awareness: [f]or workers striving to 
gain . . . decent terms and conditions of employment, there is strength 
in numbers.”114  Under the dissent’s analysis, the NLRA was not 
 
108. Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 177-78. 
109. Id. at 177. 
110. Id. at 178. 
111. Spitko, supra note 4, at 628. 
112. See Killawi, supra note 18 at 144 (explaining H-1B visas require a 
sponsoring employer). 
113. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting opinion). 
114. Id.; see also Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 63 (noting 
coercive tactics by employers such as “yellow dog contracts,” which prevented 
employees from joining a union, led Congress to pass the NLRA). 
16
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considered subordinate to the FAA because neither the case law cited 
by the majority, nor the FAA, required subordination.115 
The Epic Systems dissent also raised a few important 
considerations.  First, an individual employee’s claim may be too 
small and not worth the trouble of pursuing in court.116  Because 
mandatory arbitration subverts an employee’s right to bring a 
collective action, the employee, forced to go it alone, may never bring 
a claim.117  Second, employees might not fully understand what they 
are waiving when they agree or are deemed to have consented to 
mandatory arbitration clauses.118  Justice Ginsburg noted the 
mandatory arbitration clauses at issue in Epic Systems were emailed to 
employees.  By remaining in their employment, the employees were 
deemed to have consented.119  Mandatory arbitration, as imposed in 
the manner described in Epic Systems, raises serious concerns about 
whether the parties are truly entering into such agreements 
bilaterally.120 Third, and perhaps most important, is the fact that 
mandatory arbitration clauses stand to undermine the enforcement of 
statutory rights.121  Since mandatory arbitration prevents employees 
from bringing collective actions that may be more practical than an 
 
115. Harvard Law Review, Case Comment, Federal Arbitration Act and 
National Labor Relations Act-Arbitration and Collective Actions-Collective 
Arbitration Waivers-Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 427, 431 
(2018); see also Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting 
opinion) (“Nothing in the FAA or this Court’s case law, however, requires 
subordination of the NLRA’s protections.”). 
116. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion). 
117. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 63. 
118. Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 172 (“Studies have shown 
that these kinds of clauses are not, in fact, generally read or understood by 
employees; certainly these are not the knowing agreements alluded to by Justice 
Gorsuch [in Epic Systems].”). 
119. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1636 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion); 
see also Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 172. 
120. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual 
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 
1017, 1038 (1996) (“Some courts might find that some arbitration clauses do not 
give employees adequate notice of the fact that by signing them, they are waiving 
some or all of their statutory employment rights.”). 
121. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion) 
(noting that the enforcement gap will likely widen if employers can use mandatory 
arbitration to prevent collective action). 
17
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individual claim, employers could easily violate worker rights without 
consequence.122  Despite their education and status as professionals,123 
skilled immigrant workers in the tech sector are especially vulnerable 
to the concerns raised by the dissent in Epic Systems.   
B.  Mandatory Arbitration and Skilled Immigrants in Tech 
Tech jobs tend to be high paying124 and attract highly-skilled 
immigrants who have education and a global network.125  Like other 
educated professionals, immigrants in the technology sector enter into 
various types of employment agreements.126  Because large 
companies are more likely to utilize mandatory arbitration,127 it 
follows that highly-skilled immigrants enter into employment 
agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses with big Silicon 
Valley companies.  Like the majority’s unspoken assumptions about 
equal bargaining power in Epic Systems,128 there is a similar 
perception that professional employees have near equal bargaining 
power to negotiate contracts with employers.129  Many courts have 
echoed this sentiment, often holding professionals have equal 
 
122. See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 78, at 1309-10 
(explaining that federal and state laws enacted to protect worker rights are 
“worthless” if they are unenforceable, and employee rights are often enforced by 
workers bringing individual and collective actions in courts, but mandatory 
arbitration denies employees access to the courts). 
123. See Hyacinth Leus, Practice Tips: Using the H-1B Visa to Fill Staffing 
Needs with Foreign Professionals, 23 L.A. LAW. 24, 24 (2000) (stating  in order to 
qualify for an H-1B visa, the immigrant must qualify as a professional by having a 
university degree or equivalent professional experience). 
124. See Marissa Perino, The 20 Highest-paying Companies in Silicon Valley 
in 2019, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/highest-
paying-companies-silicon-valley-tech-2019-9 (explaining that many Silicon Valley 
companies pay salaries that are above average). 
125. See Farhad Manjoo, Why Silicon Valley Wouldn’t Work Without 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/technology/personaltech/why-silicon-valley-
wouldnt-work-without-immigrants.html. 
126. See McClure, supra note 4, at 1497-98 (listing the different kinds of 
professionals that enter into employment agreements, including engineers).   
127. Colvin, supra note 3, at 11. 
128. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 70. 
129. McClure, supra note 4, at 1498. 
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bargaining power with employers when professionals challenge 
adhesion contracts in the employment context.130  Courts reason 
employment agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses and 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are not unconscionable, nor 
entered into unknowingly, because professionals have the education, 
skills, and experience necessary to negotiate their employment 
agreements.131   
Professionals are perceived to have equal bargaining power 
because of their education, business savvy, and possible experience 
with the agreements they sign.132 One article contends professionals 
are “less likely . . . to be disadvantaged” by mandatory arbitration 
provisions, and are less likely to agree to a contract “that is grossly 
unfair to the employee.”133  However, such presumptions about 
professional bargaining power can be inaccurate.134  This is 
particularly true for skilled immigrants because they are subject to 
employment visa sponsorship by a single employer.135  Discussing the 
reliance of skilled immigrants on their employers, Robert D. Aronson 
and Debra A. Schneider note: 
Foreign nationals holding nonimmigrant visa status based on 
employment generally require the petitioning employer’s 
involvement in order to maintain status.  Not only is the beneficiary 
dependent on the willingness of his or her employer to engage in 
the sponsorship process, but the foreign national’s maintenance of 
status is dependent on the continuation of employment in a manner 
consistent with the terms of the nonimmigrant status.136 
Essentially, the unique relationship between a sponsoring 
employer and a skilled immigrant created by the H-1B visa process, 
discourages skilled immigrants from quitting or going against their 
 
130. Id. at 1509. 
131. See Spitko, supra note 4, at 628; cf. McClure, supra note 4, at 1506-07 
(detailing how courts find unequal bargaining power in cases where the employee is 
a non-professional). 
132. McClure, supra note 4, at 1515. 
133. Spitko, supra note 4, at 628-32. 
134. McClure, supra note 4, at 1516. 
135. Lister, supra note 16, at 116. 
136. Aronson & Schneider, supra note 25, at 951-52. 
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employer.137  Given the high level of dependency on the sponsoring 
employer, a skilled immigrant who is offered employment through H-
1B visa sponsorship by a tech company in Silicon Valley is likely not 
in a position to negotiate employment terms.  This is because 
changing employers on an H-1B visa costs money, can be timely and 
risky, and could jeopardize a skilled immigrant employee’s 
immigration status.138 
Despite recent reforms to employment visa sponsorship which 
aim to provide stability and security to immigrant workers, the 
complexities and risk around switching employers or disrupting a 
skilled worker’s immigration status still exists.139  These issues are 
compounded when a spouse or child is also relying on the skilled 
immigrant’s H-1B visa status because losing a job or failure to find an 
alternate employer could mean loss of immigration status for the 
entire family.140  Despite having a legal right to do so, many skilled 
immigrants cannot realistically change employers.141  Thus, the 
benefits of immigration reform do little to increase bargaining power 
for skilled immigrants.  Assuming a skilled immigrant does not have 
comparable options outside of the United States,142 she will have 
limited options under H-1B sponsorship; with limited options comes 
less bargaining power.143 
Even though highly-skilled immigrants have a certain level of 
knowledge and expertise, there can still be pressure to unwillingly 
agree to mandatory arbitration.  With employment visas, the 
 
137. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note 40, at 4. 
138. See Ahmed, supra note 75, at 945 (explaining  although changes to 
portability have made it “easier” to change employers, an H-1B visa holder still 
needs the second employer to sponsor them, submit a new application and pay fees, 
and the new application must be approved by the government). 
139. See generally Aronson & Schneider, supra note 25 (discussing different 
congressional actions and resulting regulations directed at skilled immigration and 
noting that issues of uncertainty and disrupted immigration status still persist). 
140. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor, supra note 6, at 926. 
141. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note 40, at 9. 
142. Cf. Lister, supra note 16, at 111 (skilled immigrants on H-1B visas may 
have just as good employment prospects overseas as in the United States). However, 
the Lister article does not consider other reasons why a skilled immigrant with good 
job prospects in their home country might still need a job in the United States. 
143. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 268-69 (explaining how limited 
employment options increase the imbalance of bargaining power). 
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immigrant employee relies on the employer’s sponsorship.144  
Because of this reliance on a single employer for sponsorship, skilled 
immigrant employees are in a vulnerable position and can be taken 
advantage of.145  No matter how educated or business savvy a skilled 
immigrant is, they may not resist a mandatory arbitration clause for 
fear their employer will decline sponsorship.146 Immigrant employees 
sponsored to work in the United States are simply not in a position to 
“protest unjust conditions or to quit.”147  Highly skilled immigrants 
are also unlikely to assert their rights against their employer,148 which 
brings up questions of whether consent to mandatory arbitration is 
voluntary.149  As a result, skilled immigrants who face discrimination 
or are victims of wage and hour theft may suffer in silence if their 
claim is too small to pursue individually.150 
Another potential issue is highly-skilled immigrants may not 
understand the rights they are waiving when they agree to a 
mandatory arbitration provision.151  Skilled immigrants are likely 
unfamiliar with arbitration, their legal options, and the U.S. legal 
system.152  Being in this position does not leave immigrant 
 
144. Killawi, supra note 18, at 144 (explaining skilled immigrant workers are 
usually sponsored by one employer through the H-1B temporary worker program, 
and workers who are approved enter the United States and work for their petitioning 
employer). See generally Hahm, supra note 23. 
145. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1698. 
146. See Todd H. Goodsell, On the Continued Need for H-1b Reform: A 
Partial, Statutory Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 153, 172 (2007) (explaining that employers know that H-1B employees are less 
likely to reject unreasonable assignments because their immigration status depends 
on their employment). 
147. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note 40, at 4. 
148. Goodsell, supra note 150, at 172. 
149. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1636 n.2 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting opinion). 
150. See id. at 1647 (arguing that expenses may outweigh bringing an 
individual claim, and that fear of retaliation may also deter bringing an individual 
claim). 
151. See Nimmer, supra note 67, at 206 (discussing immigrants who do not 
speak English, as “lack[ing] a strong knowledge of their statutory rights or the 
American judicial system”).  Nonetheless, the logic here, is the same, because 
although a skilled immigrant likely speaks English, they may not have the basic 
understanding of U.S. laws or the judicial system that a native-born worker would. 
152. Id. 
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professionals much better off than low-wage earning immigrants who 
may not fully understand arbitration due to language barriers.153  In 
both cases, the immigrant employee does not appreciate the rights that 
are relinquished with forced arbitration.154  Furthermore, having little 
to no experience with the U.S. legal system, immigrant employees are 
likely worse off than native-born professionals who typically have 
some knowledge of the U.S. legal system through general experience.  
Thus, highly-skilled immigrants face unique challenges that native-
born employees do not face when they are required to consent to a 
mandatory arbitration clause in an employment agreement.155 
When the overwhelming trend has become to include mandatory 
arbitration clauses in employment agreements, it becomes difficult for 
workers, including skilled immigrant professionals in tech, to 
negotiate against mandatory arbitration.156  In the unlikely event that a 
skilled immigrant professional in tech secures multiple employers for 
U.S. sponsorship, the likelihood each of those employers requires 
mandatory arbitration is high.157  In other words, skilled immigrants in 
tech faced with mandatory arbitration in one agreement are likely to 
find similar provisions with different employers.  For these reasons, 
skilled immigrant workers in tech may be in a worse position to 
negotiate employment terms than native-born professionals. 
 
153. See Carlos Antonio Lopez, Revoking an Employer’s License to 
Discriminate, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 532 (2004) (noting immigrant workers with 
limited knowledge of English “may be unaware or uninformed of their employment 
rights”). 
154. See Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 172 (“Studies have 
shown that these kinds of clauses are not, in fact, generally read or understood by 
employees.”). 
155. See Sabrina Underwood, Achieving the American Daydream: The Social, 
Economic, and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers Under the 
H-1b Visa Program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 727 (2001) (discussing the various 
inequities faced by H-1B visa workers.). 
156. See McClure, supra note 4, at 1519. 
157. See Colvin, supra note 3, at 23 (explaining that studies reveal that more 
than half of U.S. workplaces subject their employees to mandatory arbitration 
agreements). 
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C.  Public Opinion and Push Back 
Although courts have increasingly moved towards enforcing 
mandatory arbitration clauses in the employment context,158 public 
sentiment seems to be trending in the opposite direction.159  Tech 
workers have successfully used collective action to pressure some 
Silicon Valley companies to abandon mandatory arbitration, at least 
with respect to sexual harassment claims.160  Because highly-skilled 
immigrants make up a significant segment of the Silicon Valley tech 
industry,161 many of them were likely involved in worker pressure to 
change how Silicon Valley Companies resolve employment disputes.  
Tech workers’ stance against mandatory arbitration tends to mirror 
general public opinion on the issue.162  Studies also show that many 
Americans oppose mandatory arbitration.163 
 
158. Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 79. 
159. See generally Anna M. Hershenburg & Molly O’Casey, When the 
Techies Go Marching In: An Industry Updates Its Sexual Harassment Dispute 
Resolution Policy, 37 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 18 (2019). 
160. See Molly O’Casey, A Movement is Born? Google Eliminates Mandatory 
Arbitration, 37 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 60, 60-62 (2019); Daisuke 
Wakabayashi et al., Google Walkout: Employees Stage Protest Over Handling of 
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology/google-walkout-sexual-
harassment.html; Jillian D’Onfro, A Post-Walkout Google Goes Public with 
Updated Harassment and Discrimination Policies, Promises to ‘Listen’, FORBES 
(Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/2019/04/25/a-post-
walkout-google-goes-public-with-updated-harassment-and-discrimination-policies-
promises-to-listen/#17ed09e076b1; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced 
Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/uber-sex-misconduct.html. 
161. See Hahm, supra note 23, at 1682 (discussing that U.S. high-tech industry 
largely participate in H-1B visa program to meet demand for skilled workers); see 
also Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon Valley: Networks, Ethnic 
Organization, and New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 521 (2002) (stating 
“high-technology businesses around the country are often heavy users of such H-1B 
workers, nowhere more so than in Silicon Valley”). 
162.  National Study of Public Attitudes on Forced Arbitration, EMP. RTS. 
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Recent scholarship credits social movements like “#metoo” and 
“#timesup” with inspiring workers to speak out against mandatory 
arbitration of sexual harassment claims.164  In November 2018, tech 
workers at Google offices worldwide walked out of work to protest 
how Google handled sexual harassment claims.165  One of the top 
demands resulting from the protest was to abandon mandatory 
arbitration of sexual harassment claims.166  Google gave into these 
demands and abandoned mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment 
claims,167 and after additional pressure from its employees, Google 
ceased using mandatory arbitration for all employment disputes.168  
Following in Google’s footsteps, other Silicon Valley tech companies 
have eliminated mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment cases.169  
Some companies have also eliminated mandatory arbitration of 
discrimination claims as well.170   
Although not a tactic used by tech professionals, drivers for 
DoorDash, a Silicon Valley tech company, recently pushed back 
against mandatory arbitration by simultaneously filing thousands of 
individual arbitration claims.171  The arbitration fees for DoorDash 
 
164. See Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 140 (crediting the #metoo movement 
with giving low-wage workers recognition and voice to speak out about workplace 
injustices). 
165. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Disrupting Adhesion Contracts with #metoo 
Innovators, 26 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 165, 188 (2019). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 189-90; Gerrit De Vynck, Google Moves to End Forced Arbitration 
for All Worker Complaints, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2019, 1:40 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-21/google-moves-to-end-forced-
arbitration-for-all-worker-complaints. 
168. De Vynck, supra note 171. 
169. Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 94; Brendan Williams, Sign or Else: 
Employment Arbitration in the Wake of an Epic Decision, 20 MARQ. BENEFITS & 
SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 259, 268 (2019) (discussing Facebook arbitration agreement 
changes); Hershenburg & O’Casey, supra note 163, at 23-24 (discussing arbitration 
agreement changes at Apple, Airbnb, eBay, and Square). 
170. Hershenburg & O’Casey, supra note 163, at 23; see also Jennifer S. Fan, 
Employees as Regulators: The New Private Ordering in High Technology 
Companies, 19 UTAH L. REV. 973, 1013-14 (2019) (explaining that Google, Airbnb, 
and Microsoft are the few companies in Silicon Valley that have abandoned 
mandatory arbitration for discrimination claims). 
171. Charlotte Garden, Opinion, DoorDash’s Multimillion-dollar Arbitration 
Mistake, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2020 7:00 a.m.), 
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alone were about $12 million.172  When DoorDash refused to pay, the 
drivers submitted a motion to compel DoorDash to arbitrate and 
adhere to its own mandatory arbitration policy.173  Faced with 
thousands of simultaneous, individual arbitration claims, DoorDash 
wanted to abandon mandatory arbitration and proceed with a class 
action lawsuit for its own convenience.174  However, Judge William 
Alsup of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California ruled in favor of the drivers and remarked, “DoorDash now 
wishes to resort to a class-wide lawsuit, the very device it denied to 
the workers, to avoid its duty to arbitrate. This hypocrisy will not be 
blessed, at least by this order.”175   
Despite consistent judicial support for mandatory arbitration,176 
public sentiment is generally against the practice177 and push back at 
some Silicon Valley companies has been somewhat successful.178  
However, Congress has yet to deal with mandatory arbitration clauses 
in employment agreements and has only introduced bills that would 
eliminate mandatory arbitration for certain types of disputes but has 
repeatedly failed to pass such legislation.179 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/16/doordashs-multimillion-
dollar-arbitration-mistake/; Alison Frankel, ‘This Hypocrisy Will Not be Blessed’: 
Judge Orders DoorDash to Arbitrate 5,000 Couriers’ Claims, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 
2020, 2:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-doordash/this-hypocrisy-
will-not-be-blessed-judge-orders-doordash-to-arbitrate-5000-couriers-claims-
idUSKBN2052S1. 
172. Frankel, supra note 175. 
173. Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 
2020). 
174. See id. at 1065. 
175. Id. 
176. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 262. 
177. Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural 
Justice of Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 47, 77 (2010). 
178. See O’Casey, supra note 164 (discussing the various technology 
companies that have unilaterally chosen to abandon mandatory arbitration due to 
pressure). 
179. Andrew McWhorter, A Congressional Edifice: Reexamining the Statutory 
Landscape of Mandatory Arbitration, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 521, 532-33 
(2019). 
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D.  Federal Legislative Positions on Mandatory Arbitration 
Recognizing the Supreme Court’s continued support for 
mandatory arbitration in the employment context, scholar Alexander 
J.S. Colvin places hope in Congress to reverse the trend and protect 
U.S. workers.180  Many Democratic lawmakers have spoken out about 
the unfairness of mandatory arbitration, contending that mandatory 
arbitration eliminates employee choice.181 For example, a Democrat 
majority led House of Representatives introduced the Forced 
Arbitration Injustice Repeal (“FAIR”) Act which aims to restrict 
mandatory arbitration in certain contexts, including employment 
agreements.182   
The FAIR Act sets forth two purposes regarding arbitration.183  
The Act’s first purpose seeks to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements regarding future employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil 
rights disputes.184  The second purpose is broader than the first and 
seeks to prohibit “agreements and practices that interfere with the 
right of individuals, workers, or small businesses to participate in 
joint, class, or collective actions related to an employment, consumer, 
antitrust, or civil rights dispute.”185   
The FAIR Act still has an arduous journey before the bill becomes 
law,186 with opposing positions on mandatory arbitration generally 
split along party lines.187  Specifically, conservatives tend to support 
 
180. Colvin, supra note 3, at 24 (“If the Supreme Court does not reverse its 
trend of supporting mandatory arbitrations, it will be necessary for Congress to act 
to ensure that American workers have an effective means of enforcing the rights  
they have been promised.”). 
181. See generally Andrew Wallender, Democrats Decry ‘Toxic Culture’ of 
Forced Arbitration in Hearing, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (May 16, 2019, 1:06 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/democrats-decry-toxic-culture-
of-forced-arbitration-in-hearing. 
182. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. § 
2(2) (2009). 
183. Id.   
184. Id.   
185. Id. 
186. Id.   
187. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals 
for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 713 (2016) [hereinafter, Ware, Politics of 
Arbitration]. 
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the enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions, while 
progressives tend to oppose the use and enforcement of mandatory 
arbitration provisions.188  
III. ARRIVING AT BALANCED SOLUTIONS 
While there are plausible solutions to address the issues 
surrounding mandatory arbitration, these solutions are not 
comprehensive enough. For instance, it would seem that employee 
action, like the Google walkout, effectively solves the problem of 
employer-mandated arbitration, but such efforts do not yield 
predictable results.  Employees will not be successful every time they 
make collective demands on their employer.189  Additionally, leaving 
employee rights to the discretion of employers will not produce 
uniform protections for all employees.   
A common proposed solution to the issue of mandatory arbitration 
calls for Congress to pass legislation like the FAIR Act, which would 
invalidate pre-dispute arbitration in the employment context.190  This 
approach would abrogate cases like Epic Systems.191  The challenge 
with this approach is its sweeping effect.192  In some circumstances, 
arbitration can be beneficial and preferred by both parties to a 
dispute.193  By taking a rigid stance against mandatory arbitration, 
Congress would prevent employers from including arbitration 
provisions in employment agreements, even when the employee 
understands, wants, and agrees with that provision.   
Another approach to resolve problems imposed by mandatory 
arbitration is to balance the bargaining power between an employee 
and employer, preventing issues of fairness and increasing informed 
 
188. Id. at 719. 
189. Fan, supra note 174, at 998. 
190. Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 78, at 1354; Colvin, supra 
note 3, at 24; Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 94-95 (advocating for legislation that 
would make arbitration of employment disputes completely unenforceable). 
191. Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 78, at 1354. 
192. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness 
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 
457, 493 (2011) (describing a prior version of the FAIR Act as “excessively broad”). 
193. For a brief discussion on the benefits of arbitration see James, supra note 
85, at 536-41. 
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consent.194  Collective action by employees on the front end could be 
useful.  To do this, employees may consider unionizing, which would 
allow for negotiating employment terms, including whether parties 
use arbitration to resolve disputes.195  The difficulties with this 
approach are the decline of unionized labor in the United States196 and 
employers are able to vigorously reject unions in their workplaces.197  
These challenges are more profound in a place like Silicon Valley 
because unions are generally not prevalent in the tech industry.198  As 
one commentator noted, “Unionization is unlikely in industries 
marked by ‘short job tenures, heavy use of temporary labor, and heavy 
use of immigrant labor’—practices associated with Silicon Valley.”199   
Rather than a divisive approach to mandatory arbitration, an ideal 
solution is a balanced approach that considers employee rights, the 
interests of justice, and the benefits of arbitration.  By proposing 
complete elimination of mandatory arbitration in employment 
agreements, Congress assumes an employee would never consent to a 
pre-dispute arbitration provision.200 Instead, Congress could enact 
legislation that utilizes a balancing test or factor test for courts to 
follow when a mandatory arbitration clause is challenged by an 
employee.  This approach may be more likely to receive bi-partisan 
support.   
There are several balancing factors a court should consider in 
determining whether it should enforce an arbitration provision.  One 
factor a court may consider is the number of similar claims other 
employees seek to bring against the employer.  If it is clear justice is 
 
194. Green, supra note 12, at 82. 
195. Id. at 79, 89. (explaining how union representation allows for collective 
action that balances power in employment negotiations). 
196. Barbara J. Fick, The Changing Face of the American Workplace, 12 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 1, 5 (1998). 
197. Green, supra note 12, at 100. 
198. Kenneth M. Geisler II, Fissures in the Valley: Searching for a Remedy 
for U.S. Tech Workers Indirectly Displaced by H-1B Visa Outsourcing Firms, 95 
WASH. U. L. REV. 465, 500 (2017) (discussing how unions are fairly absent in the 
tech industry). 
199. Id. (quoting Hyde, supra note 165, at 498). 
200. See Sharon Hoffman, supra note 81, at 156 (discussing how the 
advantages of arbitration may be “appealing to both the employer and the employee” 
and that arbitration is a “commendable option for work-related disputes as long as 
they are not coercive”). 
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better served through a collective action, employees might not be 
forced to arbitrate.  Another factor courts may look at is the 
employee’s position in society.  If the employee’s social status is one 
that is vulnerable to exploitation or abuse, arbitration would not be 
required.  A third factor may be the legal and societal impact of an 
employee’s claim. If the claim is one that would contribute to case law 
regarding a statutory right or constitutional right, arbitration might not 
be compelled.  Lastly, courts may balance these three factors against 
the employer’s interest for seeking arbitration.  If the employer’s 
interest in arbitrating the dispute outweighs the employee’s interest 
against arbitration, then the employee might be required to arbitrate. 
A second solution could be found in the use of exceptions.  
Exceptions are a common legal mechanism and are equally as 
important as the laws they modify.201  Congress seeks to eliminate 
mandatory arbitration and practices that would limit collective action 
through the FAIR Act.202  Exceptions to a general ban on mandatory 
arbitration can achieve the objectives of the FAIR Act in a more 
equitable manner.  For example, Congress could enact legislation that 
does not outright ban mandatory arbitration, but generally prohibits 
mandatory arbitration, subject to narrow exceptions. This approach 
would likely be more successful than the FAIR Act, as drafted, 
considering the political makeup of the current Congress.203  Using 
exceptions could allow litigation or collective actions—despite 
mandatory arbitration provisions—in certain circumstances.  For 
example, the use of an exception in the case of DoorDash would have 
allowed drivers to bring a class action when the number of arbitrations 
 
201. See Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872 (1991) 
(“But although exceptions are an omnipresent feature of the legal terrain, their very 
pervasiveness appears to prompt the view that exceptions are but adjuncts to what is 
really important. However useful it may be to consider specific exceptions in 
particular doctrinal realms, thinking about exceptions as such does not get us very 
far in thinking about law.”). 
202. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. § 2(2) 
(2009). 
203. With the Democrats controlling the House of Representatives and 
Republicans controlling the Senate, legislation that completely eliminates mandatory 
arbitration is not likely to receive bi-partisan support. See Ware, Politics of 
Arbitration, supra note 191, at 719 (explaining that conservatives generally support 
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions, while progressives generally 
oppose enforcement). 
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contemplated exceeded a threshold number, which would have been 
beneficial to both DoorDash and its drivers. 
Turning specifically to skilled immigrants, Congress has enacted 
legislation to protect immigrants workers in the past.204  Because 
skilled immigrants with H-1B visa status are distinguishable from 
other employees,205 Congress can pass legislation to create an 
exception that requires employers to specifically provide sponsored 
immigrants with options for arbitration and traditional litigation.206  
Although this is not to advocate for preferential treatment of skilled 
immigrants over native-born workers,207 the rights of skilled 
immigrants in tech will be better protected if they have additional 
options to resolve their disputes.208  However, given the fact skilled 
immigrants face unique challenges with mandatory arbitration because 
of their H-1B visa status, enacting legislation with exceptions 
specifically tailored for the unique experience of skilled immigrants 
could be a useful solution. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Comment highlights, skilled immigrants in Silicon Valley 
are not likely to be viewed as a group particularly vulnerable to the 
disadvantages imposed by mandatory arbitration.  Skilled immigrants’ 
 
204. Rick Su, Working on Immigration: Three Models of Labor and 
Employment Regulation, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 331, 341 (2012) (stating that federal 
immigration laws also regulate “employment relations involving immigrant 
workers”). 
205. Rajiv S. Khanna, Liquidated Damages Clauses in H-1b Visa Holders’ 
Employment Contracts, 58 PRAC. LAW. 37, 37 (Oct. 2012). 
206. Congress has used its legislative power to address other issues unique to 
sponsored immigrants. Id. (discussing federal laws specifically tailored to protect H-
1B employees from being “subjected to penalties for leaving [a] sponsoring 
employer”). 
207. See Su, supra note 211, at 345 (recommending that regulations should 
avoid setting immigrants and native workers apart but noting immigrant workers 
need to be empowered “so that they can negotiate the labor market in the same way 
as native workers”). 
208. See Pamela G. Rubin, Immigrants as Grievants: Protecting the Rights of 
Non-English-Speaking Union Members in Labor Arbitration, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
557, 571 (1994) (contending that with labor disputes, courts and legislatures can 
“uphold immigrants’ rights by affording them more options to pursue their 
grievances”). 
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education, high-paying jobs, and status as professionals create a 
perception that they have equal bargaining power with powerful 
Silicon Valley employers. Yet, employment visa sponsorship creates 
unique challenges for skilled immigrants regarding the stability of 
their immigration status and their ability to change jobs.  Because a 
limited number of H-1B visas are in high demand, skilled immigrants 
risk their livelihoods and possible deportation if they are fired or 
unable to find another sponsoring employer.  H-1B visa regulations 
create a strong reliance on the sponsoring employer by the immigrant 
employee, drastically weakening the skilled immigrant’s bargaining 
power and their ability to negotiate arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts.  Although some Silicon Valley companies have done away 
with mandatory arbitration in certain cases, employers’ wide use of 
mandatory arbitration, and the Supreme Court’s endorsement of it, 
compounds the challenges faced by skilled immigrants. 
Moreover, extreme approaches on either side of the mandatory 
arbitration debate either disregard the notice and consent problems 
that mandatory arbitration poses, or disregard the benefits that 
consensual, pre-dispute arbitration agreements provide. The practice 
of imposing arbitration in the employment agreements cannot be 
characterized as just or fair.  Instead of endorsing or eliminating 
arbitration in the employment context, solutions should strive for a 
middle ground that allows employees to bypass mandatory arbitration 
when certain interests are served.  A less polarized approach to 
mandatory arbitration not only benefits skilled immigrant workers, but 
it is also advantageous for all U.S. workers. 
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